The Cold War and Latin American Relations by Peckham, Edmund T.
THE COLD WAR AND LATIN AMERICAN 
RELATIONS * 
I AM GOING to discuss with you today a subject very close to my heart, one of vital importance to the United 
States and to everyone concerned with our welfare and des- 
tiny. My topic is the doctrine of internationalism, and per- 
haps this Sunday afternoon faculty lecture series may be a 
fitting opportunity to mount the pulpit and preach an hour's 
sermon on a gospel so widely shared among contemporary 
American historians and political scientists. 
In today's world it is impractical, if not completely impos- 
sible, for anyone who lives in our country and who takes an 
active interest in global affairs to be a thorough-going isola- 
tionist. The school of thought which in the disillusioning days 
after Versailles produced William E. Borah and other Senate 
irreconcilabIes has now been superseded by a new genera- 
tion which realizes that American concerns no longer stop at 
the water's edge. Today's leaders see that a nation with our 
tremendous powers and potentialities can not be retiring, 
smug, and self-centered. The Joseph Kennedys and the 
America Firsters who opposed international commitments 
in the 1930's and early 1940's in the face of the menace to 
world peace posed by the Axis powers are now an insignifi- 
cant determinant in the shaping of our foreign policy, al- 
though it is true, as professional worriers constantly remind 
us, that a core of diehards still remains. 
The proof of &is remarkable growth in national maturity 
(and I use that word advisedly) can be well exemplified by 
the careers of two able and well-known gentlemen from 
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Massachusetts, both of whom served their country and the 
Bay State in the United States Senate-Henry Cabot Lodge, 
with his eminently successful campaign against American 
entry into the League of Nations and his unswerving loyalty 
to the blustery, navy-conscious Teddy Roosevelt; and Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Jr., who since his defeat for reelection in 1952 
has acted as a special adviser to President Eisenhower and 
has represented the administration and the American people 
at the United Nations. The lives of these two men represent 
the evolution of a broader approach and at least the be- 
ginning stages of a willingness to cooperate with other races 
and peoples, guiding and not dominating, with the optimis- 
tic hope that eventually we shall all be able to dwell together 
in a safe and sane world. 
What has replaced the old traditionalist pattern of thought 
is a rising realization that total American isolationism under 
modern conditions is no more than an idle dream, in many 
ways a pleasant and appealing one, but still a mirage too 
costly and dangerous even for over-indulgent Americans to 
entertain. This is probably the most startling and radical 
change in the brief two centuries of our national existence. 
I t  is not necessarily a phenomenon which follows campaign 
platforms or election returns. Awareness of our present role 
and status is not truly sectional, for Gallup polls and the 
other much maligned samplers of public opinion reveal that 
the Midwest and the Deep South, regions once the heartland 
of dogmatic conservatism, are today much more receptive to 
an internationalist climate than in the day of Harding and 
Coolidge. 
Nor is internationalism a monopoly of any single political 
party or any particular class or type of occupation, despite 
writers like the justly famous Charles A. Beard who like to 
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apply the neo-Marxian paint-brush of economic determinism 
to American history. Isolationists of many different back- 
grounds and persuasions once thronged on both aisles of 
Congress; and, until the depression period of the 1930's and 
even beyond, American labor unions and their most progres- 
sive spokesmen, such as Samuel Gompers, were rock-ribbed 
in their insistence on 100% Americanism. Our newspapers, 
too, are responding to the internationalist tide. Today even 
the Chicago Tribune and the Hearst press seem to be mel- 
lowing, as, to paraphrase Mr. Dooley, editorial policies fol- 
low the circulation figures. 
I wish that it were possible for all Americans to agree 
wholeheartedly on a set course of action for our country, 
whether this might involve aid to Franco and Tito or a 
shield protecting the Pescadores and Formosa, and then to 
hold matters of foreign policy out of the mud of party poli- 
tics; but this desire is doubtless too unreal and idealistic. 
Perhaps the millennium when diplomatic affairs will be abo1.e 
partisan bickering will never wholly arrive. Even in the 
darkest days of the 1930's and 1940's, when World War II 
was swiftly approaching, many short-sighted politicians were 
unable or at least unwilling to submerge their instinctive 
dislike of the domestic aspects of the New and Fair Deals. 
There was little unity on international problems. 
Even in times of war and peril bipartisan statesmen like 
Michigan's Senator Vandenberg have always been in the 
minority; and the rightness or wrongness of diplomatic 
events has repeatedly been a matter of prolonged and acid 
discussion, as in the Great Debate over imperialism after 
the Spanish-American War or in the more recent instances 
of the Yalta agreement and the Truman-MaeArthur contro- 
versy over Korea. Foreign questions make ideal political fuel; 
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and in this light it was altogether natural and inevitable dur- 
ing the heated 1954 off-year congressional race for the Derno- 
crats to assail the diplomatic framework constructed by Sec- 
retaly Dulles and his aides, just as it was expeditious for 
Vice-President Nixon to stump the country defending the 
accomplishments of the administration in foreign fields. 
What is encouraging, though, is the striking resemblance 
between the Republican and the Democratic approach to 
external developments. There is much harrnony across party 
lines. For all practical purposes there is no such thing as a 
new or an old look. Neither the donkey nor the elephant is 
isolationistic; both are outward- and forward-looking. The 
main differences are just in degree, 
Much has been written about American diplomacy and 
the hands-off doctrines which for many years characterized 
our official governmental attitudes toward other nations. But 
few will deny that the passage of time does work miracles, 
even in bureaucratic Washington; and many shibboleths 
once considered sacred are now outmoded. We shall see that 
this is true of the original concept of our venerable Monroe 
Doctrine of 1823. I t  is just as true for the repugnance, al- 
most revulsion, with which until very recently most Ameri- 
cans, and practically all politicians, have regarded any for- 
eign bonds which restless constituents and opposition party 
soap-box orators could denounce as "entangling alliances." 
Yet today times have changed. Huge jet bombers laden 
with hydrogen eggs and guided missiles can now span in 
a few hours the oceans which we once considered our most 
secure cloak, covering distances in minutes which in the 
age of sail and steam required days, weeks, and even months. 
Russian prototypes of our newly launched Nautilus, with 
atomic power plants and an almost unlimited cruising radius, 
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can wreak incalculable havoc with our vital shipping and 
supply lines and can quite conceivably obliterate entire sea- 
coast cities. In the tense cold war being waged today the 
Arctic wastelands are no longer the immense impenetrable 
shield of muskeg and tundra which they seemed as recently 
as World War 11, when Sitka and Attu were very much on 
the periphery of our defense lines. Alaska is no longer so re- 
mote as it seemed to the everyday citizen who scoffed in 
1867 at "Seward's Icebox." Rather the frozen Far North is 
the highway of the future, as planes follow the great circle 
routes over the North Pole. From Arctic bases Moscow, 
Leningrad, Stalingrad, and other key Russian cities are as 
much within the orbit of our strategic air command as New 
York, Chicago, and San Francisco are within range of Soviet 
aircraft. 
This is not a comfortable or relaxing age in which we are 
living, and in which the free nations of the world are strug- 
gling to survive; but history is dynamic. Wishful thinking 
alone can not recreate the peace and security of the past. We 
must learn to cope with present conditions, adapt ourselves 
to the accelerated pace of modern living, and combat the 
haunting doubts and fears which harass any politically con- 
scious citizen and which must constantly beset our leaders 
and policy makers. The position of our chief of state is an 
unenviable one, although a surprising number of people still 
want to be president. I t  is not surprising that our chief ex- 
ecutives often feel the overpowering urge to escape, whether 
to a trout stream, a yacht cruise down the Potomac, a poker 
game with White House cronies, a Gettysburg farmhouse, or 
a round of golf. 
Rip Van Winkle found many transformations in the tiny 
sleepy Dutch hamlets lining the Hudson River, but most of 
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these changes occurred in the midst of his magical twenty 
year nap. Our world has altered overnight. Germany and 
Japan, our major foes in World War 11, are now among our 
most consistent friends and supporters outside the Iron Cur- 
tain. The Soviet Union, China, and their satellites were all 
listed as protagonists on the program of the play which 
ended its six year run in 1945, whereas today they are our 
most bitter enemies. Many of our older traditional allies seem 
more critical and more lukewarm in their friendship. We 
even have a whole new school of American histol-ians-the 
revisionists. These individuals, many quite prominent and 
renowned in their field, claim grandiloquently that World 
War I1 was all a mistake; that we were forced into fighting 
the wrong foes in 1941 by the war-mongering F.D.R. and his 
left-wing clique of conspirators, who deliberately permitted 
the disaster of Pearl Harbor to arouse Congress and the pub- 
lic; and that it would have been much simpler and wiser to 
coexist with the totalitarianism of Hitler, Mussolini, and 
Tojo. 
Much of this is second-guessing of the ordinary Monday 
morning quarterback type, which is always easier after the 
game is over; but surely the changes which we have wit- 
nessed since 1945 surpass any of the diplomatic revolutions 
which have transpired earlier in the history of mankind, such 
as those preceding the Seven Years' War and the defeat of 
Napoleon at Waterloo. I t  is a certainty that future historians 
-if indeed there is to be any future history-will take due 
note of this upheaval in their textbooks, Under the circum- 
stances it is not surprising that some people have, in the 
colorful phrase of Adlai Stevenson, had to be pulled kicking 
and screaming against their will into the 20th century, Let us 
rather be thankful that so many have, and that our foreign 
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policies now reflect a healthier, broader willingness to accept 
the hardships and to assume as our lot the tremendous moral, 
physical, and financial burdens of our role as the leader of 
the free as against the slave world. 
Our whole foreign policy must be world-wide, and the 
machine~y of our Department of State nlust be revamped. 
All too often the various desks and bureaus have reached 
decisions for one region with far-reaching implications for 
others, and today there seems to be a need for concentration 
and coordination of authority such as that recommended by 
the Hoover Commission but stalemated and pigeonholed by 
Congress ever since. Our government, like everything else 
in the United States, is big; but it should not be unwieldy or 
topheavy. 
Internationalism is costly, and no one likes to foot the tax 
bills; but as the British discovered during the 17th and 18th 
centuries it is far cheaper to buy a balance of power than to 
expend one's own armies and manpower wastefully at the 
wrong time and on the wrong battlefields. Much as we regret 
recent developments in Viet Nam and Laos, direct Anierican 
military intervention of the scope and scale of the "police 
action" in Korea would have been infinitely worse. It was 
hard enough to convince our infantrymen moving out on 
routine daily patrols in the no-man's-land across the 38th 
parallel that they were fighting and dying to protect their 
loved ones at home. Dienbienphu was a tragedy which we 
were powerless to avert. No one likes a lost cause; and in our 
present condition we cannot withstand every peripheral 
move made by our enemies, though we must carefully gauge 
the prestige effect of cheap Red gains at our expense. We 
must deploy our forces as mobile reserves, like the Seventh 
Fleet in the Strait of Formosa; for were we to dissipate our 
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strength futilely we would be discarding the last great deter- 
rent to another incalculably terrible world war. One can lose 
many battles and still win a final victory. 
Despite our size alid our rapidly growing population sta- 
tistics, despite our economic strength and untapped poten- 
tials, we in the United States cannot depend on past glories or 
rugged individualism. Nor is the deep religious faitli in 1x1- 
man beings and their civilizations which is often expressed 
by Arnold J. Toynbee a fully satisfactory solution, although 
Christianity is our most persuasive ideological asset in this 
world of fear and uncertainty. Despite Rousseau and the 
romanticists man is not necessarily innately good; not all 
action is progress. We must work to achieve our goals and 
not rely on pacifism or fatalism, Both terms connote inaction; 
both imply defeat. 
This is the setting into which I want to place the subject of 
this afternoon's lecture-a world in which no nation can 
stand alone, a war of words in which both belligerents are 
striving frantically to win friends m d  influence people. To- 
day more than ever before in our history we Americans must 
endeavor to convince other countries and their millions of 
inhabitants that the democratic society and forms of govern- 
ment in which we take such pride are the best way of life, 
the only logical means by which people have tlie opportunity 
to escape the debasement which communism entails. I t  is a 
global battleground, monumental in the degree of its totality. 
I t  dwarfs the array of forces aligned in 1914 and 1941. It 
turns the world into an armed camp in which geopolitical 
factors of all types are of fundamental irnportance-psycho- 
logical impressions, raw materials and physical resources, and 
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above all the sheer mass and weight of h~lman numbers. We 
must today turn to others for help. 
The old maxim has never been more true-united we stand, 
divided we fall. We must try to comprehend and even sym- 
pathize with the differing points or' view of other countries 
and their statesmen. We cannot afford the luxury of a smug 
xenophobia. With a little reading and study in world history 
we can appreciate, although probably not admire, the neu- 
tralism to which Nehru and his adherents cling. We can un- 
derstand the roots of the antagonism usually mouthed by the 
French national assembly at the European Defense Commu- 
nity or any other scheme embracing a newly rearmed and re- 
vived Gelmany. From our Olympian heights we may be 
exasperated by India's failure to cooperate with our plans 
for Southeast Asia and her apparent preference for her 
powerful neighbors ruled by Mao-Tse Tung and Ho Chih 
Minh. We may feel that Premier Mend&-France converted 
the Geneva conference into another Munich settlement. We 
may dislike the trend toward appeasement which seems to 
be gaining in popularity in western European capitals; but 
the overly frank and devastating criticisms voiced in our 
press and the senselessly vitriolic statements proclaimed by 
some of our more vocal public figures (usually after a brief 
and cursory recess junket financed by public funds)-men 
like Texas' own Tom Connolly or Ole late Senator Pat Mc- 
Carran-are unwise and may in the long run prove disastrous 
to friendly relations. 
I t  is a difficult and often a thankless task to adapt our 
policies to foreign problems. We cannot please everyone. Not 
even a Solomon could find a course of action for the United 
States wholly palatable to Israel and the Arab League in 
their boundary disputes and border incidents, or to France 
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and her turbulent colonials in Morocco and Algeria, or to 
Pakistan and India in the ages-old enmity between Moslem 
and Hindu. Nevertheless, we can try, curbing our impatience 
and our natural impulse to meddle where we are not wanted. 
Our share in resolving the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute and the 
Suez Canal question points the way to future settlements, as 
does the accord recently reached between Yugoslavia and 
Italy over the disposition of the thorny danger spot of Tri- 
este. 
We wonder at the seeming ingratitude of foreign countries 
which have benefited enormously from years of American 
gererosity. We have contributed greatly to world prosperity 
and recovery, through U.N.R.R.A., the Marshall Plan, Point 
4 assistance, and the aid to Greece and Turkey embodied in 
the far-sighted Truman Doctrine. We also have tried to alle- 
viate want and starvation in distress areas througl~out the 
world, with shipments of surplus grain to feed the hungry in 
India, the fabulous Berlin airlift, gifts of money and supplies 
to people everywhere made homeless by floods and earth- 
quakes, and open-handed distribution of materiel of all de- 
scriptions no longer needed by our armed services. But we 
must recognize that these steps on our part are often cold 
and calculated acts of seI6shness-enligllte~led selfishness to 
preserve our four freedoms and national existence, it is true, 
but nonetheless measures taken primarily in our own inter- 
est, not principally with the needs and welfare of the recip- 
ient at heart. Other nations are grateful for our largesse, but 
they know perhaps more than we realize what is the prime 
motive behind our munificeilce. CARE parcels or Bundles for 
Britain are pieces of propaganda which speak for themselves, 
but we cannot expect our dollars to buy the souls of for- 
eigners just as endowed as we with a sense of pride and 
honor. 
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We tend to become annoyed too easily at any show of 
independent thinking on the part of our allies and forthright 
leaders of the stamp of Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-Chek. 
We become IGgllly indignant when 10 Downing Street and 
its venerable spokesmen, Sir Winston Churchill and Sir An- 
thony Eden, express a willingness to trade with Red China 
and Redder Russia, recognize the Communist regime in 
Peking, envision the coexistence of two distinct Chinas, or 
call for a conference "at the top" without the sanction of 
Washington officialdom. Nor should we expect to purchase 
whole foreign offices with commercial concessions. Our t a r 8  
barriers often reveal our true sentiments more loudly and 
authoritatively. One of the many strange anomalies of pres- 
ent day America is the fact that the Hawley-Smoot Act of 
1930 is still law despite the passage of two decades of the 
reciprocal trade agreements instigated by Cordell Hull and 
his successors. It is di£6cult to explain the urgent necessity of 
excluding Swiss watch movements or Spanish filberts or even 
Scotch whiskey from ready access to American markets and 
consumers, and it is next to impossible to reconcile tlle whole 
concept of protectionism wit11 an internationalist foreign 
policy. 
In this world of unrest and tension where can we in the 
United States find friends? For reasons of mutual benefit we 
can usually rely on the countries of the western fringe of 
Europe and the Mediterranean and the patchwork of states 
in the Near and Middle East, although perhaps this is due 
more to the menacing Russian divisions poised on the fron- 
tiers of the Soviet Union than to a conviction that the United 
States is always blameless in international disputes. Some- 
times it is hard to realize that few people share our self- 
righteous certainty in the Simon-purity of our motives and 
actions. Our past is checkered with instances of broken trea- 
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ties, ulterior intentions, and devious diplomacy. We have be- 
trayed countless promises and pacts made with our native 
Indian tribes. At least twice, in 1846 and 1898, we have coun- 
tenanced acts of open aggression in wars which many on- 
lookers then and since felt unjustified, but which Presidents 
Polk and McKinley, both pious Sunday church-goers, de- 
clared to be the net result of irresistible provocation. Should 
we not expect foreigners to distrust us? The lessons of history 
are not easily forgotten; and the picture of the expansionistic 
United States, greedily and covetously eying the lands and 
possessions of its weaker neighbors, is difEicult to erase, espe- 
cially in Latin America. 
Our experiences in the not-so-united United Nations since 
1945 have convinced many political observers that our truest 
friends are to be found nearer home-in this hemisphere, in 
Canada and the assortment of 20 Latin American republics 
south of the Rio Grande. This conviction is of very recent 
date. For many years the United States, the ccColossus of the 
North," in its blundering fashion almost deliberately seemed 
to woo the enmity of the Latins; and in this endeavor we 
made a resounding success. We looked with distaste on the 
illiterate, poverty-stsicken, disease-ridden, unsanitary coun- 
tries so close to our borders, as if afraid that we ourselves 
might become contaminated. We blamed the Latins them- 
selves for their poor standard of living, heedless of the possi- 
bility that their mixed racial stocks, their Spanish absolutist 
heritage, their ignorance of the most elementary democratic 
procedures, and their traditional emphasis on a single staple 
crop economy might be contributory causes to their very evi- 
dent lack of political stability. We did nothing to counter the 
appalling infant mortality rate wllich was more than counter- 
acting their high annual birth figures, for the age of organ- 
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ized charity and humanitarianism in this country had not yet 
arrived, awaiting the income tax amendment and Treasury 
decisions that gifts and contributions to worthy causes could 
be construed as valid tax deductions. For their part, the 
Latins with considerable justification regarded norteame~.i- 
canos as a gang of insolent, swaggering braggarts and money- 
grubbers, eager to exploit their backwardness and misfor- 
tunes. 
The anti-Yanqui hostility so deeply ingrained in many 
South Americans and artfully fed by ultra-nationalist rulers 
such as Juan Domingo Per6n and subservient organs of an 
unfree press dates from the 19th century, and helps account 
for the preferential treatment accorded European traders and 
financiers before the outbreak of World War I. Latin 
America looked to England for its shipping and inanufac- 
tures, to Germany for its military advice, and to France for 
its culture and fashions. Pol+tefios from Buenos Aires pride 
tl~emselves on the marked resemblance of their beautiful 
capital city to Paris, and wealthy ladies of the beau nzonde 
like Evita Perbn have for years been the best patrons of 
Jacques Fath and Christian Dior. 
The United States did make a nwked penetration into the 
profitable and ahnost limitless Latin American market in the 
lands surrounding the Caribbean, but the vast half of South 
America below the bulge of Brazil remained virtually iso- 
lated and immune from the concerted efforts of high pressure 
American sales promotion. Our businessmen might dream 
rapturously of selling a pair of leather shoes or a Sunday-go- 
to-meeting suit to every barefoot naked Indian, as other 
travelling salesmen and promoters such as James Hill of the 
Northein Pacific liked to figure the money which they could 
mint by changing the national diet of Chinese coolies from 
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rice to wheat bread, or, to use a more up-to-date simile, by 
providing a chicken in every pot and a car in every garage; 
but our great economic and commerical opportunities only 
arose when two world wars funneled Latin American trade 
into United States channels. 
Our political actions did little to reassure the republics of 
South and Central America of our benevolence and good 
will. After much grudging deliberation and soul-searching, 
Henry Clay's campaign for the recognition of the revolu- 
tionary regimes in Mexico, Colombia, and the Rio de la Plata 
was rewarded; but this was only after Sim6n Bolivar, Jos6 de 
San Martin, Sucre, Mitre, and other key military leaders had 
wrested their separation from despotic Spain and her power- 
mad king Ferdinand VII. By then independence was prac- 
tically a fait accmnpli. Our lack of participation in the abor- 
tive Panama Congress of 1826 is a further indication that 
except for a few hardy American adventurers our early re- 
publican fervor had cooled to caution and reserve. 
Moreover, for the next hundred years we continued to fail 
in the task of ingratiating ourselves with our southern neigh- 
bors. The Monroe Doctrine was the corner stone of our 
policy statements for more than a century after its formula- 
tion in 1823 by the President and his energetic Secretary of 
State, Jolm Quincy Adams, in an attempt to forestall the 
supposed machinations of the reactionary Holy Alliance; but 
this essential core of our ideological paraphernalia was a 
completely unilateral proclamation, enunciated and enforced 
without the slightest attention to Latin American desires or 
interests. In  the long and exceptionally detailed series of 
books written by Dexter Perkins, the eminent diplomatic 
historian who has made a career and life study of the Doc- 
trine, the main thread of the narrative is invariably the whim- 
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sical, unpredictable course pursued by the United States and 
its so-called Latin American experts. 
Sometimes, as during t l ~ e  ill-starred Maximilian episode in 
Mexico, our State Department presented stiff protests to Na- 
poleon I11 and issued belligerent warnings to other interlop- 
ers, decrying any semblance of European intervention or 
royalist dabbling in the New World. While unwilling to 
annex the peninsula of Yucatan ourselves in its perennial 
conflict with authorities in Mexico City, we managed to foil 
any transfer of the province to England or Spain in re tu~n for 
military assistance. We fulminated against Spanish intrigues 
in the 1860's in Santo Domingo and the guano-rich chain of 
islands off the coast of Peru. We extended the no-transfer 
principle corollary of the Doctrine to Cuba and the Danish 
West Indies when the spectre of a united Germany, hungry 
for colonies and world recognition, appeared on the inter- 
national horizon in the 1870's. 
On other occasions our government has remained 
strangely silent. Our policy has been satirized as "keeping the 
rain off Latin America with a British umbrella," in the guise 
of His or Her Majesty's fleet; and it is undeniably true that 
South and Central America took little stock in the Monroe 
Doctrine as an instrument of their happiness and welfare and 
looked to England for their aid and protection. Although we 
might resent, as did John Quincy Adams, the appearance of 
coming in as "a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of- 
war," we did lack the naval strength to counter or fend off 
any open invasion in the western hemisphere. 
Much has been made of the innate hostility of British- 
American relations in the 19th century; and certainly many 
instances of ill-will and open conlgict can be found-in the 
Fenian raids into lower Canada; in the apparent British sym-  
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pathy for the Confederate cause in the War between the 
States; and in Honduras and Nicaragua, where the two great 
Anglo-Saxon countries vied for territory and political hegem- 
ony. In 1854, for example, an American naval vessel bom- 
barded the British-run city of Greytown, seat of the English 
protectorate over the Mosquito Indians, in retaliation for an 
unpleasant incident in which the United States minister was 
slashed in the face by a broken bottle wielded by an overly 
exuberant native. 
Nevertheless, for parallel con~n~ercial nd financial reasons 
our over-all Latin American policy in the 19th century 
usually coincided with that of the imperious George Canning 
and his successors as Foreign Secretary, culminating in the 
self-denying Bulwer-Lytton treaty, which another generation 
was to regard as "the most persistently unpopular pact ever 
concluded by the United States." We find upon close ex- 
amination that almost all the major violations of the Monroe 
Doctrine countenanced by Washington with little more than 
a polite murmur were accomplished by the agency of Great 
Britain. 
England encroached with impunity in the 1830's aIong the 
Mosquito coast and consolidated its holdings in British Hon- 
duras and British Guiana in a period when colonialism in this 
hemisphere ran counter to the prevaiIing political winds. 
Another case, nearly disastrous in its unfortunate long-sange 
repercussions, occurred in 1833 when our country permitted 
Great Britain to annex the barren Falkland Islands as a land 
base for her whaling vessels. Argentina has never forgiven us 
for this act of deliberate omission, if not outright commission; 
and the tiny islets lying offshore from the estuary of the Rio 
de la Plata still appear on her maps as Argentine territory and 
still kindle the spirit;, of portefio patriots, much as do the 
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similar geographical expressions, Fiume and Trieste, on the 
Adriatic. 
We have permitted European countries to wage war on 
small, helpless Latin American states to redress grievances or 
to enforce the sanctity of financial contracts; but once again 
England was usually involved as a participant, either alone or 
in concert with other creditors, as in the Mexican interven- 
tion which led to the short ivle of Maximilian. Britain at- 
tacked Argentina twice during the dictatorship of Rosas. She 
was implicated in 1902 with Italy and Germany in the chas- 
tisement of the cruel Venezuelan despot Cipriano Castro, 
wllom the forthright Teddy Roosevelt disillissed as "that un- 
speakably villainous little monkey." This is not to imply that 
other powers were blameless in theis designs on the New 
Vyorld. France gained title to the Swedish West Indian island 
of St, Bartholomew without our consent; and her troops set 
foot on American soil in the region of the River Plate and in 
Mexico. One instance was the so-called Pastry War, a desul- 
tory skirmish to secure reparations for alleged damages, in 
which the foremost casualty was the left leg of the colorful 
Mexican general Santa Anna, of San Jacinto and Alamo fame 
-or ill fame. For the most part, though, the 19th century was 
distinguished by a policy of laissez-faire toward England, 
with Latin American concerns subordinated to other con- 
siderations. The chief targets of administration wrath were 
the less powerful land-bound countries on the continent of 
Europe. 
0 0 0 
Those who argue that from the outset the Monroe Doc- 
trine was a vistuous document designed and molded for the 
protection and betterment of Latin America find it hard to 
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reconcile sentimentality with cold historical facts. The Doc- 
trine gradually became the agency and then the justification 
for northern intervention, and it has had a mischievous and 
pernicious effect on hemisphere relationships. We might talk 
in pleasant-sounding platitudes about a globe divided by its 
Creator into separate spheres, the Old World and the New, 
where never the twain should meet; but for many years the 
United States did not interpret the Doctrine in any way as a 
pledge of self-abnegation or as a sawdust trail to hemispheric 
happiness and brotherhood. 
The Doctrine gathered dust from disuse until it was re- 
vived and expanded by President Polk to bolster our shaky 
claims to Texas and to California. Expansionism was "the 
great American disease," rampant tl~roughout the pre-Civil 
War period; and Latin Americans eyed our insatiable appe- 
tite with understandable fear. Even the eminently successful 
treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848, which stripped pros- 
trate Mexico of half her territory, was not rewarding enough 
to mollify the greedy advocates of the all-of-h4exico move- 
ment, so that in 1853 we blackjacked Mexico in the Gadsden 
Purchase with another bite south of the Gila River to accom- 
modate the construction of the Southern Pacific Railroad. 
Nor was our land hunger conhed to regions contiguous 
to the Rio Grande. Led by its Young America wing, the 
Democratic party tried to shake the ripe apple of Cuba loose 
from the Spanish tree, to use the famous metaphor found in 
many contemporaiy newspapers and journals; but our efforts 
met with no success. Failure was certainly not due to lack of 
effort, however, as the story of the 1840's and 1850's attests. 
Only shasp sectional divisions foiled Pierre Soulk and his 
fellow signers of the Ostend Manifesto, and volunteers from 
New Orleans and Charleston swelled the ranks of the hetero- 
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geneous armies of Narciso L6pez and other Cuban liberators. 
In these same decades a motley group of American filibus- 
terers under the spell of the notorious William Walker won 
unofficial governmental approval for their designs on Lower 
California and Nicaragua, 
The period after 1865 has been dubbed "the nadir of 
American diplon~acy," an era in which the United States 
looked inward rather than outward, filling in the vast empty 
spaces of our West and erecting the pinnacle of business 
wealth, strength, and consolidation which was not to topple 
until the crash of 1929. Yet expansionism and its effects on 
Latin American opinion did not die in 1860. Under Republi- 
can auspices we intrigued to obtain Samanh Bay and the 
Danish West Indies, or Virgin Islands; and our search for 
extraterritorial bargains went unrewarded largely because of 
Senate quibbling over the proposed price tags. With an elo- 
quent outburst of fevered imagination Secretary of State 
Seward told an audience of proper Bostonians, "Give me 
fifty, forty, thirty more years of life, and I will engage to give 
you the possession of the American continent and the control 
of the world." 
Later secretaries were more subtle. James G. Blaine, the 
plumed knight from the state of Maine, acted as peacemaker 
in several inter-American disputes; but his reaction was far 
different when a mob of Chilean rioters knifed a drunken 
party of American sailors on shore leave at Valparaiso, as 
they were carousing in the True Blue Saloon. Then, too, t l ~ e  
real motive behind the first Pan American conference in 
1889-1890, inspired and dominated by Blaine, was to pro- 
mote American trade and business; and the bewildered dele- 
gates were treated to a whirlwind 6,000 mile tour of United 
States factories and industrial plants in order to wean them 
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from their customary European connections and overwhelm 
them with the size and grandeur of our country. Little was 
done to promote Latin American security and progress. 
The 1890's ushered in a new age in Latin American rela- 
tions, as the eagle of in~perialism began to scream. For the 
first time the United States entered actively and willingly 
the realm of international affairs. Even mild-mannered 
Grover Cleveland, the foe of Hawaiian annexation, yielded to 
the political expediency of twisting the British lion's tail, 
authorizing his jingoistic Secretary of State, Richard Olney, 
to declare in a stinging dispatch to London, "Today the 
United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and 
its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its inter- 
position." 
This insolent "twenty inch gun7' note nearly involved us 
in war over the swamps and gold fields along the disputed 
Venezuela-British Guiana boundary line, but eventually 
sanity returned; and providentially British attention was 
diverted to the Boer uprising in South Africa. Three years 
later, however, the voices of moderation were drowned out 
by the fire-eaters and war-hawks in Congress and by the 
hysterical yellow press. The belligerency craze resulted in 
the relatively cheap and easy triumphs of the Spanish- 
American War. At the peace table the United States gained 
Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and a tutelage over Cuba and 
its spacious Guanthnamo Bay only thinly disguised by the 
Platt and Teller Amendments. 
After perhaps the most acrimonious and momentous of the 
many great debates in our history the Senate accepted our 
new manifest destiny as a world power. The United States 
became enmeshed in a new web of interests and grew in- 
creasingly careless of the rights of its neighbors. To big navy 
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men like Mahan, Lodge, and the ebullient Teddy Roosevelt 
the Caribbean loomed tremendously vital to American strat- 
egy, a Mediterranean Sea or Roman lake all our own. Our 
big stick, "cowboy diplomacy" and our determination to 
"make the dirt fly" led to the Panama Canal steal of 1903 
and to a foreign policy refreshing in its candor and directness 
if not its honesty. Then, as a result of the Venezuelan crisis 
of 1902 and distrust of the mailed fist of Kaiser Wilhelm 11, 
came the ill-omened Roosevelt Corollary, which imparted to 
the United States an international police power and com- 
pletely transformed the nature and original design of the 
Monroe Doctrine. We were now to act first to ensure Carib- 
bean political and economic stability and eliminate the need 
for European nations to spank Latin American countries to 
collect debts by force or by one-sided arbitration. 
With this legalistic justification successive administrations, 
with bipartisan approval, proceeded to interfere blatantly in 
the affairs of Caribbean states-Roosevelt in Santo Domingo; 
the stalwart, portly, and amiable Taft in Nicaragua; and even 
the anti-imperialist Woodrow Wilson in the negro republic 
of Haiti, after the particularly brutal assassination of Presi- 
dent Guillaume Sam in the sacred confines of the French 
legation in Port-au-Prince. In each case American protection 
brought many gains in public health, sanitation, education, 
and internal improvements. American customs receivers and 
financial advisers introduced a new sense of efficiency, hon- 
esty, and responsibility among government oEcials. Native 
constabularies managed to maintain order. 
The people prospered; but so did the horde of United 
States businessmen and investors who hastened to take ad- 
vantage of the protection afforded by the State Department 
and gain control of railroads, banks, and sugar and banana 
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plantations. One economic expert, DT. Jacob Hollander of 
Johns Hopkins, collected $132,000 for his services in scaling 
doml the national debt of the Dominican Republic, excep- 
tional pay for any professor! The emphasis placed by Presi- 
dent Taft and his Secretary of State, Philander ICnox, on the 
substitution of dollars for bullets failed to assuage the res- 
tiveness of Latin Americans, who chafed audibly at the pres- 
ence of marine detachments and the other trappings of 
American rule. 
One might reasonably expect the administration of Wood- 
row Wilson to display friendship for the depressed peoples of 
Latin America, and his renowned Mobile speech of 1913 
seemed to lreynote better tidings, Ironically, though, Wilson's 
emphasis on moral rights and social justice, so well expressed 
in the idealistic 14 Points, only served to complicate our inter- 
American relationships. Our ambassador to Mexico during 
Taft's single-term occupancy of the White House had played 
an unsavory enough share in the series of bloodthirsty revo- 
lutions wllicl~ followed the overthrow of the aged dictator 
Poi-firio Diaz, but Wilson's impractical insistence that a gov- 
ernment must always rest on the consent of the governed 
was almost as unfortunate. This attitude merely prolonged 
the anarchy in Mexico and provided a backdrop for shooting 
incidents at Tampico and Vera Cruz, Pancho Villa's sorties 
in New RIesico, and General Pershing's undignified and fiuit- 
less pursuit through the mountain wilderness of Sonora and 
Chihuahua. 
Hitherto the United States had followed a policy of de 
facto recognition of any regime which had established and 
maintained its control, whereas the. new concept placed our 
country in the unenviable position of a supranational judge 
with life or dead1 power over foreign governments. Diplo- 
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matic recognition does not necessarily mean approval, as we 
proved in 1933 with our negotiations with Maxim Litvinoff 
of the Soviet Union, and as we shall again eventually demon- 
strate when we reluctaiitIy but inevitably admit the reality 
and existence of Communist China. It is difficult to ignore a 
state which dominates several hundreds of millions of peo- 
ple. Wilson was rescued from his Mexican fiascoes by an offer 
of mediation by the A.B.C. powers of South America, and 
public attention was soon turned to the problems of involve- 
ment in World War I. It is not beyond the realm of possi- 
bility that our earnest adherence to the United Nations may 
provide a solution for our present dilemma. 
The tale of inter-American relations since 1920 is a much 
more pleasant chapter in our diplomatic history. Latin 
Americans renewed their demand for a share in the interpre- 
tation and enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, hitherto a 
monopoly jealously reserved by the United States. The Doc- 
trine was specifically included in the much-maligned Ver- 
sailles treaty upon the insistence of the Republican Round 
Robin; but our decision to remain outside the League of 
Nations made the United States more amenable to a policy 
of retrenchment and conciliation elsewhere, especially in the 
western hemisphere. 
Both major political parties share the credit for this rea- 
wakened sense of enlightened statesmanship. Before any 
lasting trust and cooperation could asise, we had to liquidate 
and specifically renounce our Model-T Latin American policy 
of misunderstanding and ill will, a ~ d  to create new institu- 
tions and procedures for consultation and joint action. In  his 
Mobile speech Woodsow Wilson declared that the United 
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States would never "seek one additional foot of territory by 
conquest," and his acceptance of outside A.B.C. mediation 
was a promising weathervane presaging the trend of the 
1920's and 1930's. 
We salved our sense of guilt by voting $25 million to 
Colombia as conscience money for the Canal land grab. We 
participated in the premature Little Washington Conference 
of 1922-1923 with representatives of several Latin American 
countries and quietly abandoned the Lodge Corollary, which 
discriminated against certain foreign firms in the New 
World. We signed a general arbitration in 1929 which re- 
jected war as an instrument of national policy and which also 
committed the United States to a tribunal where the justices 
would be arrayed 4: 1 against us. 
The Senate condemned the outmoded Roosevelt Corollary 
and its sanction of United States intervention in Latin 
America in 1929; and the Clark memorandum backed with 
the blessing of Coolidge and Hoover maintained in 1930 
that the Monroe Doctrine henceforth was to be directed 
against Europe, not Latin America. We abrogated the Platt 
Amendment in 1934, thereby ending any pretense of open 
interference in Cuban politics. In the same year we withdrew 
our last marines from Central American stations. We freed 
Panama from her onerous treaty obligations in 1936, and the 
series of 16 conciliatory reciprocity agreements lowering our 
tariff walls piecemeal in the early New Deal period greatly 
stimulated trade in a depression era. 
The government even managed to stomach the expropria- 
tion by Calles and Chdenas of foreign petroleum land hold- 
ings in Mexico, despite outcries in the press that Mexico was 
turning bolshevist. Americans had invested heavily south of 
the border at the encouragement of Porfirio Diaz; but now 
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our mining magnates, cattle barons, and oil companies were 
sacrificed on the altar of hemisphere solidarity, regardless of 
the outraged protests of the Sinclairs and Guggenheims who 
had multiplied their original investments many times over. 
Rather, through the wise auspices of Dwight Morrow, we 
increased our purchases of Mexican silver, stabilized the 
wildly fluctuating peso, and granted loans through the facili- 
ties of the Export-Import Bank as the Axis threat to world 
peace grew. 
This olive branch type of diplomacy attained its height and 
its fullest development under F.D,R. In a typical ringing 
phrase inserted in his initial inaugural address President 
Roosevelt coined a now weI1-known teim: "In the field of 
world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of 
the good neighbor-the neighbor wlio resolutely respects 
himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of 
others." Roosevelt correlated this good neighbor policy, 
which in itself was neither new nor original, to Latin America 
in a speech before the Pan American Union, F.D.R. was 
always deeply interested in Latin America and its cares. He 
even claimed authorship of the 1918 Haitian constitution 
while serving as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and his per- 
sonal appearance at the 1936 Pan American Conference in 
Buenos Aires made a deep impression on the delighted Ar- 
gentines. Roosevelt also disregarded the advice of several 
close associates by authorizing our delegation to Montevideo 
in 1933 to sign the so-called Latin American Declaration of 
Independence-"No state has the right to intervene in the 
internal or external affairs of another." 
As war clouds appeared in the 1930'~~ the device of fre- 
quent Pan American conferences initiated by Blaine was 
regularized and expanded. At Buenos Aires the delegates 
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agreed to consult if the peace of the Americas was threat- 
ened, and two years later at Lima specific arrangements for 
meetings of foreign ministers were planned. Accordingly at 
Panama in 1939 a security belt was drawn around the New 
World (although it was frequently violated, as by the pocket 
battleship von Spee, which was scuttled in the Rio de la 
Plata after sanctuaiy in Uruguay was denied); and economic 
contracts were signed to purchase Brazilian rubber and 
coffee, Bolivian tin, Argentine canned beef, and other prod- 
ucts in which the United States stood in critically short 
supply. 
The foreign ministers assembled again in 1940 at Havana 
after the fall of the Low Countries and France, the low water 
mark of World War 11, when Great Britain faced the Luft- 
waffe and Wehrmacht alone. They quickly decreed a joint 
administration for colonies belonging to countries overrun by 
the Nazi juggernaut and passed overwhelmingly the famous 
"all for one and one for all" principle: 'Any attempt on the 
part of a non-American State against the integrity or in- 
violability of the tei-ritoiy, the sovereignty or the political in- 
dependence of an American State shall be considered as an 
act of aggression against (all) the States which sign this 
declaration." Steps were taken to calm any sensation of panic 
and to counter the activity of fifth column saboteurs and 
propagandists, for several countries possessed large national 
enclaves of German and Italian sympathizers, 
After the disaster of 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor nine 
countries copied our lead in declaring war immediately on 
Germany, Italy, and Japan, More followed after the 1942 Rio 
meeting of the foreign ministers, and by V-E Day even Chile 
and Argentina had unenthusiastically joined in the struggle. 
Time and space are too short to detail the gratifying story of 
Cold War and Latin American Relations 9'7 
cooperation during World War 11. Latin America stepped up 
her vital contributions of strategic material-rubber, tin, cop- 
per, tungsten, balsa wood, and kapok. Brazil furnished us air 
bases for anti-submarine patrols and for ferrying supplies the 
short route across the Atlantic, thus speeding the D-Day 
schedule for our North African campaign, Operation 
TORCH, in November 1942. From the Ecuadorian Gal&- 
pagos Islands navy seaplanes maintained watch over the soft 
western underbelly approaches to the Panama Canal. Brazil 
detached troops to Mark Clark's command in the Italian 
theater, and Mexico sent an ail-force squadron to the Pacific. 
Nevertheless, toward the end of the war the wheels of 
inter-American cooperation began to slow down, The United 
States was planning carefully for the projected U.N. organi- 
zation so dear to the heart of Franklin Roosevelt Latin 
America had no voice at Dumbarton Oaks, in the Quebec 
conferences, or in the wartime talks which culminated at 
Yalta. Early in 1945 we caused widespread resentment by 
bludgeoning six South American countries into a belated 
declaration of war against the Axis powers by threatening to 
exclude them from seats at San Francisco. The touchy Latins 
were nettled by the way in which their consent to our post- 
war designs was taken for granted. 
Largely at the insistence of the Latin American states the 
United Nations charter left room for the operation of re- 
gional security systems; and the paper solidarity of the west- 
ern hemisphere has been established by the Act of Chapul- 
tepec of 1945, treaties signed n~ultilaterally at Rio and 
Bogoth in 1947-1948, and the far-reaching Organization of 
American States (O.A.S.), which was born at Bogoth in 1948. 
These agreements bind the signatories to mutual defense and 
to a pacific settlement of all inter-American arguments, such 
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as the recurring border disputes between Haiti and dictator 
Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. A wary eye has always 
to be cast at Middle America, the Balkans of the New World, 
for the countries of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica 
have historically been a constant cockpit of bickering and 
unrest, as recent headlines prove. All regional procedures 
must be exhausted before any recourse is made to the Se- 
curity Council at U.N. headquarters in New York. 
Under the Republican administration chosen by the elec- 
torate in 1952 Latin American relations have shown a marked 
improvement. Foreign investments, loans, and technical 
Point 4 aid through the Foreign Operations Administration 
have been substantially increased, enabling our soutllern 
neighbors to expand transportation and industrial facilities 
and to concentrate on the constant problem of combatting 
low standards of living. Our foreign policy has broadened 
from the almost completely European orientation which so 
disappointed Latin America after the end of fighting. Fur- 
theirnore, our disillusionment at continued U.S.S.R. intran- 
sigence in exercising the veto on all important questions has 
made us treasure more highly the value of the large bloc of 
good neighbor votes in the General Assembly. President 
Eisenl~ower's vow in his inaugural address to place more 
emphasis and reliance on Latin American contacts met wit11 
an instantaneously favorable response in foreign capitals; 
and in recent months many efforts have been made to win 
the friendship of our fellow Americans, such as the popxilar 
tour of Milton Eisenhower and disaster relief shipments of 
food to Haiti after the tragic devastation of Hurricane Hazel. 
Public opinion regarding the United States is still far from 
the attitude which we might ideally desire, particularly 
among the left-wing intellectuals and intelligentsia and the 
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militaristic and nationalistic extreme right-wing elements in 
countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile; but there was 
remarkably little protest about the apparently decisive par- 
ticipation of our Ambassador Peurifoy in the recent deposi- 
tion of President Jacobo Arbenz and his Moscow-inspired 
party in Guatemala. We should be relieved that the ghost of 
anti-Yanquiism has been laid to rest and be content that the 
vast majority of Latin America is well-disposed to us. 
There are still trouble spots, such as the powerful chau- 
vinistic Peronistas in Argentina; doubtless there always will 
be. But at last we seem to have leai-ned the vital lesson of 
consulting the interests of our good neighbors as well as our 
own selfish inclinations. I t  is comforting in these days of ten- 
sion to realize that we in the United States are no longer iso- 
lated from our most natural friends and allies. Man was not 
meant to stand alone. 
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